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RECENT CASE NOTES
render judgment for a less amount, unless the party in whose favor the
verdict was rendered consents to the reduction, since a reduction under
such circumstances invades the province of the jury, the proper course, if
a remittitur is refused, being to set aside the verdict and award a new
trial." 12
Likewise an increasing of a verdict by a court without the consent of
the party prejudiced is clearly violative of the conditional guaranty of
13
trial by jury.
These various rules exhibit the constant effort to protect the right of
parties to trial by jury where such right has not been waived. Where
this right exists, it should be protected, but it is certainly not logical for
these considerations in any way to affect or hamper an appellate court in
its disposition of equity proceedings. The Supreme Court of Indiana has
aptly displayed that it fully recognizes its power to render final judgment
under such circumstances, although the instant case is one of only a few
in which the appellate court of Indiana has exercised its power in reviewing an equitable proceeding. Most of the cases indicate that the distinctions between review of legal and equitable cases are overlooked. Our
appellate court ought never to sustain an equitable decree simply because
there is some evidence from which the trial court might reasonably have
found as it did; they have the power and duty to decide the case on their
own view as to what the evidence reasonably establishes. And certainly
an equitable case ought not to be sent back for a new trial. If the evidence is incomplete the court can order it supplemented in a proper manner.
P. J.D.
BILLS AND NOTES-ACCOMMODATION PARTImS-LIABILITY By ESTOPPEL-

In November of 1926, $271,000 in Liberty Bonds were stolen from the Wild
Bank. An examination of the bank, shortly afterwards, revealed an impairment of capital. The bank commissioner required that the capital of
the bank be increased and, as a condition upon which the bank be allowed
to continue operation, required that high-grade securities worth $100,000
be delivered to him to hold for the protection of creditors. In December
of 1926, Wild, the president of the bank, asked Millikan, Todd and Appel
to lend accommodation paper to the bank. Todd executed a note for $25,000
to the bank, Appel executed a $25,000 note to the bank, and Millikan executed a $50,000 note to the bank. The notes were executed without consideration and the makers did not know of the impairment of capital or
to what use the notes were to be put. Millikan and Appel knew of the
bond theft, which had been published in the papers. Wild abstracted
$100,000 of Indianapolis school bonds from the assets of the bank and
delivered them to the banking commissioner, substituting the notes as
assets of the bank. Statements to the public of the bank's financial condition included the notes as assets of the bank, as did reports to the bank
commissioner, which did not disclose the fact that part of the bank's assets
consisted of accommodation paper. This fact was discovered on a later
A. L. P. 779.
American Railway Express Co. v. Bender (1926), 20 Ohio App. 436, 152
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N. E. 197.
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examination of the bank and the bank was closed. In actions by the makers
for surrender and cancellation of the notes, the receivers of the Wild Bank
filed cross-complaints for recovery on the notes. Recovery on the notes in
question would inure to the benefit of the creditors of the bank and not
merely to its stockholders. A few of the creditors of the bank testified
that they would not have left deposits in the bank and would not have
made new deposits had they known that part of the assets of the bank consisted of accommodation paper. Held, that as the accommodation makers
placed no restriction on the use to be made of the notes by the bank, they
were estopped to deny consideration for the notes.'
The bank, having received the accommodation notes, might make either
of two practical uses of them. It might transfer them to another for
value or it might list them as assets. If the notes had been transferred
to another for value, Burns (1926), Sec. 11388 would apply. This section
provides, "An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument
as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving face value
thereof and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person.
Such person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to
be only an accommodation party." While the statute provides that an
accommodation party shall be liable to a holder for value, it does not
purport to make him liable only to a holder for value and to none other,
and does not preclude liability based upon estoppel. In refusing to infer
a negative meaning to the statute, the court in this case has avoided the
error made by many courts and has construed the statute with the reasonable liberality with which a codifying statute should be construed in order
to insure that uniformity of construction which the codification was in2
tended to obtain.
There is little, if anything, relating to estoppel to set up defenses to a
bill or note which is not merely an application of the general rules of
estoppel and governed thereby. 3 The elements essential to make out an
equitable estoppel as applied to cases of misrepresentation are: (1) Misrepresentation of a material fact by the party sought to be estopped, (2)
made with knowledge of the fact, (3) with the intention that another party
shall act upon it, (4) who was ignorant of the truth, (5) relied upon such
representations and was induced thereby to act to his injury, (6) which
he would not have done except for such representation. 4 The representation may be by declaration, act or conduct, so long as it is of a material
fact.5 If the party sought to be estopped was careless in making statements about which he ought to have known the truth, he may in some
cases be held to constructive knowledge of the facts.6 It is not necessary,
in order to create an estoppel, that the person who makes the representa'Igehart, et. al. V. Todd, et al.; Same v. Appel, et al.; Same v. Mallikan, et
al.; Supreme Court of Indiana, Dec. 8, 1931, 178 N. B. 685.
2 6 Tulane Law Review 11 (1931).
a8 C. J. 720.
4Taylor v. Griner (1913). 55 Ind. App. 617, 104 N. E. 607.
521
C. 3. 1120.
6
Wright v. Fox (1913), 56 Ind. App. 315, 103 N. E. 442; Taylor v. Griner
(1913), 55 Ind. App. 617, 104 N. E. 607.
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tions upon which another acts should, at the time of making them, intend
to defraud the person to whom they are made, for the fraud consists in
subsequently attempting to gainsay or deny the representations to the
injury of the person who acted upon them.7 The doctrine of estoppel, so
defined and explained, has been applied in many cases on bills and notes.
In the principal case, while a recovery inures to the benefit of all creditors,
it was not shown that all creditors relied upon the appearance of assets
created by means of the notes, it being shown that only a part of the bank's
creditors actually relied upon this appearance of assets. While the court
does not discuss the element of reliance in its opinion, it relies upon Golden
v. CervenkPa5 for the receiver's right of recovery, and in that case the court
said that so long as subsequent creditors had a right to rely upon the representations there was an estoppel in their favor and it was immaterial that
they did not rely upon the representations or even know of them. There
seems to be little authority in support of this position, the cases holding
that it is not sufficient that there might have been a change of position if in
reality there was none. 9 However, there seems to be an exception to this
rule where some creditors have relied upon a representation and some have
not. Where the debtor's property is taken away because of the estoppel set
up by some creditors, such creditors do not thereby gain a superiority over
other creditors.O If the property is to be taken away from the true owner
because he is estopped as against some creditors, fairness seems to require
that it be shared in by all the creditors; and this may be no detriment to
the true owner, the only other person interested.
A receiver of an insolvent corporation represents creditors as well as
stockholders, holding the property for the benefit of both, and as their
trustee may maintain and defend actions which the corporation could not.
It has been held that the receiver of a national bank will not be permitted
to recover on an accommodation note where it does not appear that the
money is required to pay creditors of the bank.12
In the principal case, however, a recovery will inure to the benefit of
creditors. The acts of the makers of the notes assisted in making possible
the misrepresentation and if they might reasonably have anticipated some
change of position consequent upon such assistance, there is an estoppel
by "assisted" misrepresentation. 13 Because, as mentioned above, the bank
made one of only two possible practical uses of the notes, it would appear
that the makers of the notes might reasonably have anticipated some
change of position due to their acts. Therefore, the case seems to have
been correctly decided upon the basis of estoppel.14
0. M. B.
?Maxon v. Lane (1890). 124 Ind. 592, 24 N. E. 683.
8278 Ill.
409, 116 N. E. 273 (1917).
9Davis v. Bank of England (1824), 2 Bing. 393, 130 EngL Repr. 357. See also
Barton v. London, etc. Co. (1889), 24 Q. B. Div. 77, 59 L. J. Q. B. 33.
10
Ewart on Estoppel, p. 142 (1900).
"1Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead (1898), 149 Ind. 560, 49 N. E. 592, 32
L. R. A. 725, 63 Am. St. Rep. 302; Marion Trust Co. v. Blish (1908), 170 Ind. 686,
84 N. E. 814, 85 N. E. 344, 18 L. 1. A. (N. S.) 347.
2
'Lon8 v. Westwater (1909), 173 Fed. 111.
1
3Rwart on Estoppel, pp. 169-170 (1900).
"The principal case has been noted in 45 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1932), the objection there being taken that the maker does not acquiesce in the representations

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
CASHIER'S CHECK-FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION-NON-LIABILITY OF BANK
-Oris 0. Kinder, plaintiff, acted as auctioneer in selling real estate for one
Schultz. The purchaser, one Edstom, gave Schultz a check of $500.00 as
down payment. Plaintiff and Schultz took the check to the bank after
closing hours, explaining to the acting cashier the circumstances under
which the check was made and that they wished to cash it so Schultz could
pay plaintiff his commission, the amount of which had been agreed upon.
The acting cashier explained to them that he could not cash the check as
it was after closing hours, but he could give cashier's checks to them in
consideration of Schultz endorsing the check of Edstom to the defendant
bank. This was done. Payment on Edstom's check was stopped and plaintiff sues the defendant bank upon the cashier's check. Held, that there
was a total failure of consideration. Judgment for defendant, affirmed.'
The probable majority of jurisdictions recognize a cashier's check
merely as an inland bill of exchange and subject to the same rules as
2
The cases reaching the opposite result from
govern bills of exchange.
the principal case seem to be based upon the belief that a cashier's check
should be more than an ordinary check. The question has been settled in
some states by decisions and in at least one state by statute. 3 In that
state "all deposits not otherwise secured and all cashier's checks, certified
checks or sight exchange issued by banks operating under this law shall
be guaranteed by this act." A more moderate statement of the same rule
is that a cashier's check is not subject to countermand like an ordinary
check.4
Plaintiff in the principal case might be considered in some jurisdictions
as a holder in due course. Although he knew of the transactions which
gave rise to the execution of the cashier's check he apparently was not
guilty of any fraud in procuring the execution of it, and also was apparently under the belief that the maker had executed it upon a valuable
consideration. These last two elements being true it would leave the plaintiff in the position of a bona Me purchaser of the note for value before
maturity.5
Another view contra to the one in the principal case is where cashier's
checks were issued at a depositor's request, it is to be "presumed" that
there was a consideration moving from the depositor to the bank, and the
want of consideration moving from the payee to the bank is immaterial.
It was further held that a bank, by issuing a cashier's check in reliance
upon the sufficiency of the balance or credit of the depositor, who requested
the issuance of the check, incurs a direct primary obligation to the payee
unless mere delivery of the notes be regarded as acquiescence, although the desirability of the result is admitted. A note in 6 Univ. of Cin. L. Rev. 242 (1932)
objects to the case for the same reason.
'Kinder v. Fisher's Nat. Bank, Appellate Court of Indiana, Oct. 16, 1931,
177 N. E. 904.
2 Culter v. Repnolds (1872), 64 Ill. 321; People -v. Miller (1917), 278 Ill. 490,
116 N. E. 131; Duke v. rohnson (1923), 127 Wash. 601, 221 Fac. 321; Drinkall V.
Bank (1901), 11 N. D. 10, 88 N. W. 724, 57 L. n. A. 341.
3 Sec. 3596, Hemingway's Code (Miss.) ; Anderson -v. Bank (1924), 135 Miss.
351, 100 So. 179.
4 Krinkall v. Bank (1901), 11 N. D. 10, 88 N. W. 724, 57 L. It. A. 341.
5Gagle v. Lane (1887), 49 Ark. 465, 5 S. W. 790.

